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Abstract
This article addresses the issue of the funding of civil litigation within the framework of access to justice and
the normative goal of increasing access to the civil justice system. The author critically analyzes and cautiously
advances the case for the recent development of the financing of litigation by third-party investors. The
argument is that investor financing has the potential to increase access to the civil justice system by
ameliorating the economic barriers to litigation. The author evaluates investor financing against existing public
and private models of financing litigation such as legal aid plans, litigation subsidy funds, and contingent fee
arrangements. The doctrines against maintenance and champerty, which prohibit third parties from providing
financial assistance to litigants, are reviewed and analyzed in order to assess the enforceability of financing
agreements between plaintiffs and investors. The author then examines the market that is likely to develop for
the financing of litigation and analyzes regulation that may be required to protect investors and plaintiffs. The
author evaluates policy concerns in relation to the wide-spread availability of investor financing and concludes
that such concerns are either misguided or can be addressed by implementing appropriate regulatory
safeguards.
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FINANCING OF LITIGATION BY
THIRD-PARTY INVESTORS:
A SHARE OF JUSTICE?©
BY POONAM PURI*
This article addresses the issue of the funding of civil
litigation within the framework of access to justice and
the normative goal of increasing access to the civil
justice system. The author critically analyzes and
cautiously advances the case for the recent
development of the financing of litigation by third-party
investors. The argument is that investor financing has
the potential to increase access to the civil justice
system by ameliorating the economic barriers to
litigation. The author evaluates investor financing
against existing public and private models of financing
litigation such as legal aid plans, litigation subsidy
funds, and contingent fee arrangements. The doctrines
against maintenance and champerty, which prohibit
third parties from providing financial assistance to
litigants, are reviewed and analyzed in order to assess
the enforceability of financing agreements between
plaintiffs and investors. The author then examines the
market that is likely to develop for the financing of
litigation and analyzes regulation that may be required
to protect investors and plaintiffs. The author
evaluates policy concerns in relation to the wide-spread
availability of investor financing and concludes that
such concerns are either misguided or can be addressed
by implementing appropriate regulatory safeguards.
Cet article traite la question de financement de litige
civil dans le cadre de l'acces A la justice et le but
normatif visant A augmenter I'acc~s au syst me de ]a
justice civile. L'auteure analyse de mani~re critique,
tout en avangant avec pr6ecaution, le cas du
d6veloppement r6cent du financement de litige civil par
une tierce partie d'investisseurs. L'argument est que le
financement par investisseurs a le potentiel
d'augmenter 'acc s au syst~me de justice civile en
am61iorant les barri~res 6conomiques du litige.
L'auteure 6value le financement par investisseurs
contre les mod~les publiques et priv~s de financement
de litige tels que le plan d'aide 16gale, le fonds de
subvention de litige et les frais contingents
d'arrangements. Les doctrines contre les cofits de
maintien et de promotion qui interdisent aux tierces
parties de fournir une assistance finanei~re aux
plaideurs sont r6examin6es et analys6es afin d'estimer
le renforcement des contrats de financement entre
plaignants et investisseurs. L'auteure examine ensuite
le marchd qui est plut6t apte a se d6velopper dans le
financement de litige et analyse le r~glement qui
pourrait 8tre requis pour prot6ger les investisseurs et
les plaignants. L'auteure examine des questions
relatives As la politique en rapport avec la disponibilit6
tr~s r6pandue du financement des investisseurs et elle
en conclut que de telies questions sont soit peu
judicieuses soit qu'elles peuvent etre r6solues par
l'impl6mentation de sauvegardes r6glementaires.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The civil justice system is out of the reach of most Canadians,
despite the fact that access to the courts for all citizens is a fundamental
pillar of our society.' The primary economic barrier to pursuing a
lawsuit is legal fees. 2 The Report of the Ontario Civil Justice Review
modeled the legal fees of a typical civil case for a three day trial in the
Ontario Court (General Division) and calculated a total cost of $38,200
to the plaintiff3 Justice Cory of the Supreme Court of Canada noted in
1994 that "the total legal bills of all parties in an average General
I See Ontario, Report of the Ontario Legal Aid Review: A Blueprint for Publicly Funded Legal
Services (Toronto: Ontario Legal Aid Review, 1997) (Chair: J.D. McCamus) [hereinafter McCamus
Report]; F.H. Zemans & P.J. Monahan, From Crisis to Reform: A New Legal Aid Plan for Ontario
(Toronto: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy, 1997); and Ontario, Civil Justice
Review: First Report (Toronto: Ontario Civil Justice Review, 1995) (Co-chairs: R.A. Blair & Sandra
Lang) [hereinafter Civil Justice Review].
2 Civil Justice Review, supra note 1 at 145.
3 Ibid. at 143-45. The model assumes a total of 191 hours at an hourly rate of $200 including
30 hours of trial time, 30 hours of preparation for trial, and 25 hours for two days of discovery
(including preparation time). The model excludes costs to taxpayers such as judges' salaries and
courthouse administration.
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Division lawsuit (including those that settle before trial) may easily
amount to between $40,000 and $50,000."4 Other costs include
disbursements such as court filing fees, service of process fees, and fees
relating to examinations for discovery. Expert testimony and reports,
which have become increasingly common, also increase the costs of
litigation significantly.5
These costs, although substantial in absolute terms, are even
more significant in the context of the average income of Canadians. In
1996, for example, the average income of an unattached individual was
$24,433, and the average family income was $56,629.6
In an empirical study of people's attitudes on the issue of access
to civil justice, W.A. Bogart and Neil Vidmar found that "a substantial
majority thought that the cost of the system is too high and that it takes
too long." 7 They also found that of persons who had a problem but did
not consult a lawyer, 17 per cent thought "a lawyer would cost too
much."8
Public sector initiatives such as legal aid and litigation subsidy
funds and private sector initiatives such as contingent fee arrangements
have developed over time to redress some of the cost barriers to
litigation. A recent private sector development is the financing of
litigation by third-party investors who provide the funds to litigate a
claim in exchange for a share of the proceeds if the lawsuit is successful.
This article attempts to critically analyze and cautiously advance
the case for investor financing of lawsuits. The argument is that investor
financing has the potential to increase access to the civil justice system
by ameliorating the economic barriers to litigation. Among the factors
4 Per Mr. Justice Cory, citing a paper by George Adams in Coronation Insurance Co. v.
Florence (8 August 1994), (S.C.C.) [unreported] [hereinafter Coronation Insurance] as cited by
Brockenshire J. in Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd., 28 O.R. (3d) 523 at 34 (Gen.
Div.) [hereinafter Nantais]. See also G.W. Adams & N.L. Bussin, "Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Canadian Courts: A Time for Change" (1995) 17 Advocates' Q. 133 at 143, note 29.
5 See M. Conrod, Experts Have More Scope Following S.C.C. Ruling, Lawyer's Weekly (12
December 1997) 17, in which Richard Bogoroch is quoted as saying a "trial has become a battle of
the experts." See also G.D. Watson & Mr. Justice C. Perkins, Holinested and Watson: Ontario Cil
Procedure, vol. 4 (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 57§4, 57§12 for a discussion of the costs of experts.
6 See online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/People/Families/
famil05.htm> (date accessed: 15 February 1999). Family refers to an "economic family," which is
defined as "a group of individuals sharing a common dwelling unit who are related by blood,
marriage (including common-law relationships) or adoption."
7 W.A. Bogart & N. Vidmar, "Problems and Experience with the Ontario Civil Justice System:
An Empirical Assessment" in A.C. Hutchinson, ed., Access to Civil Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1990)
1 at 49.
8 ibid. at 33.
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preventing the widespread adoption of investor financing is the
uncertainty surrounding the prohibitions against champerty and
maintenance and some aspects of securities regulation. These laws are
analyzed and evaluated in light of the normative goal of increasing
access to the justice system. Concerns about problems that might result
from the widespread availability of investor financing are either
misguided or can be addressed by existing or proposed regulatory
safeguards.
Advancing the case for investor financing requires situating the
issue of funding litigation within its social context and acknowledging
some of the complexities surrounding the access to justice debate. First,
it is acknowledged that access to the civil justice system does not
necessarily equate with access to justice. 9 The development of investor
financing calls for other initiatives to better align the civil justice system
with justice, or alternatively, to find better methods than the civil justice
system to resolve disputes that are more in line with our conception of
justice.
Second, economic barriers are not the only barriers to accessing
the civil litigation system. Non-economic barriers to litigating a claim
can be significant and include the complexity of legal proceedings, the
delay associated with taking legal action to redress one's rights, the
psychological barriers relating to the formality of the judicial system, and
language barriers. 10 Non-economic barriers have a tremendous impact
on people's ability and willingness to access the justice system; much
work is being done in this area to ameliorate these barriers.
Third, reducing the costs of litigation should be distinguished
from financing litigation. A large body of academic literature exists, and
many initiatives are underway, that focus on attempting to reduce the
costs of litigation by simplifying procedural and substantive laws;
encouraging the use of paralegals; -widening the jurisdiction of small
9 For a discussion of the conflation of the term "access to justice" with "access to the courts,"
see M.J. Mossman, "Access to Civil Justice: A Review of Canadian Legal Academic Scholarship
1977-1987" in Hutchinson, ed., supra note 7, 53 at 54, 66-68; S.C. McGuire & R.A. Macdonald,
"Small Claims Court Cant" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 509 at 510; and I. Morrison & J. Mosher,
"Barriers to Access to Civil Justice for Disadvantaged Groups" in Ontario, Rethinking Civil Justice:
Research Studies for the Civil Justice Review, vol. 2 (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission,
1996) (Chair: J.D. McCamus) 637 at 650 [hereinafter Rethinking Civil Justice].
10 See Morrison & Mosher, supra note 9 at 650-63, where barriers to accessing the justice
system are discussed.
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claims courts; and even banning lawyers from certain fora.1 1 The
financing of litigation is similar to legal aid plans and contingency fees in
that it takes the costs of litigation as a given, and redistributes the costs
and risks of litigation away from the plaintiff to other stakeholders.
Having defined and positioned investor financing of litigation
and the problem of funding civil litigation within the framework of
increasing access to justice, Part II outlines the different models that
exist to address the funding problem, and suggests that investor
financing is similar to these other models and can complement them.
Part III reviews the doctrines against maintenance and champerty which
prohibit third parties from providing financial assistance to litigants.
Part IV then applies the doctrines against maintenance and champerty
to investor financing of litigation to assess the enforceability of
agreements between plaintiffs and third-party investors; it advances the
case for legislative abolition of these doctrines in order for investor
financing to realize its potential to ameliorate economic barriers. Part V
examines the market that is likely to develop for financing litigation and
analyzes the regulation that may be required to protect investors and
plaintiffs. Part VI makes the case for a more secure footing of investor
financing, examines the real and imagined problems that might result
from the widespread availability of investor financing of litigation, and
proposes regulatory safeguards to deal with potential abuses. Finally,
Part VII sets out the conclusions.
II. 'MODELS OF FINANCING LITIGATION
Before endorsing investor financing of litigation as a means of
promoting access to the courts, it is first necessary to evaluate it against
three public and private sector models that have been developed to
finance the costs of litigation. In what follows in Part II(A)-(D), below,
it is suggested that while investor financing is very much akin to these
models, these models are structurally limited in their ability to achieve
access to the courts and that the gaps that they leave can be nicely
plugged by a model of investor financing.
11 For recommendations which may have the effect of reducing the cost of litigation, see K.
Roach, "Fundamental Reforms to Civil Litigation" in Rethinking Civil Justice, supra note 9, 381; and
I. Ramsay, "Small Claims Courts: A Review" in Rethinking Civil Justice, supra note 9,489.
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A. LegalAid
Government sponsored legal assistance plans, otherwise known
as legal aid, are designed to assist those without adequate financial
means in accessing the justice system. Legal aid plans shift the cost and
risks of litigation away from the plaintiff to the funders of the plans. The
Ontario Legal Aid Plan is financed by the provincial and federal
governments, the Law Foundation of Ontario, and contributions from
lawyers and legal aid clients.12
B. Public Litigation Subsidy Funds
The Ontario Class Proceeding Fund ("Fund"), 13 which came into
existence on January 1, 1993 together with the Class Proceedings Act,
1992,14 is a public fund established to subsidize the costs of class action
litigation.IS The Fund is operated by the Law Foundation of Ontario,
and is endowed with $500,000.16 The Fund reduces the cost barriers to
pursuing class actions by providing financial support for disbursements
related to proceedings17 and indemnification for costs in the event that
an action is unsuccessful.18 The representative plaintiff must, on behalf
of the class, undertake to reimburse the Fund by providing 10 per cent of
12 See Morrison & Mosher, supra note 9 at 637.
13 See Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 7
[hereinafter Class Proceedings Funding].
14 S.O. 1992, c. 6.
15 See Ontario, Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (Toronto: Ontario
Law Reform Commission, 1982) vol. 3 (Chair: D. Mendes Da Costa) at 711-14 [hereinafter Report
on Class Actions]. Quebec also has a public fund to subsidize class actions. In Quebec, the fund is
known as the "Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs" and is administered by the government.
Assistance is provided for lawyers fees in addition to disbursements. If the action is successful, the
fund is reimbursed by the costs award, and the fund bears the loss if the action fails. See L.
Ducharme & Y. Lauzon, Le recours collectif Quibicois (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 1988);
and J.A. Dufour, "Le financement de recours collectifs" in A. Prujinerand & J. Roy, eds., Les
recours collectifs en Ontario et au Quibec (Montr6al: Editions Wilson & Lafleur, 1992) 103.
16 Class Proceedings Funding, supra note 13, s. 59.1. The Fund was endowed with $300,000 in
1993. An additional $200,000 was added the following year.
1 7 Ibid. s. 59.1(2)1.
18 Ibid. s. 59.1(2)2.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
a successful award or settlement to replenish the Fund.t 9 Funding is not
automatic. The criteria for assessing applications include a
consideration of the merits of the case and whether the plaintiff has
made reasonable efforts to obtain funds from other sources. The Class
Proceedings Committee may also consider whether the plaintiff has
established appropriate financial controls to ensure that any funds
granted are spent on their designated purpose and the extent to which
the issues in the proceedings affect the public interest.20
C. Contingent Fee ArTangements
Contingency fees are a private means of reducing economic
barriers to litigation. Contingency fee arrangements transfer the risks of
litigation to the lawyer retained to represent the plaintiff.2' In a typical
arrangement, the lawyer will obtain a percentage of the plaintiffs award
if the lawsuit succeeds, in exchange for bearing the risk of no
compensation if the lawsuit fails. Contingency fees were historically
prohibited by common law and statute,22 but are now accepted in all
Canadian jurisdictions, except Ontario, where a modified contingency
fee arrangement is allowed only in relation to class proceedings.23
19 Ibid. s. 59.5(1)(g) provides that the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations
"providing for levies in favour of the Class Proceedings Fund against awards and settlement funds in
proceedings in respect of which a party receives financial support from the Class Proceedings
Fund." 0. Reg 771/92, s. 8(4)(c) sets out the 10 per cent requirement.
20 Ibid s. 59.3(4)(d) and 0. Reg 771/92, s. 5.1.
21 For an analysis of contingency fees, see M.J. Trebilcock, "The Case for Contingent Fees:
The Ontario Legal Profession Rethinks its Position" (1989) 15 Can. Bus. L.J. 360; Roach, supra
note 11; and R.W. Painter, "Litigating on a Contingency: AMonopoly of Champions or a Market
for Champerty?" (1996) 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 625. See also the following articles from the
Symposium on Contingency Fee Financing: M. Galanter, "Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The
Contingency Fee and its Discontents" (1998) 47 DePaul L. Rev. 457; H.M. Kritzer, "The Wages of
Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice" (1998) 47 DePaul L. Rev. 267; and R.H.
Mnookin, "Negotiation, Settlement and the Contingent Fee" (1998) 47 DePaul L. Rev. 363.
22 See notes 69-71, infra, and accompanying text for a discussion of contingency fees
constituting champerty and maintenance.
23 Class Proceedings Act, 1992, supra note 14, s. 33. The Ontario legislation allows lawyers to
receive, subject to court determination, a multiplier of their hourly fee in the event of success of a
lawsuit, rather than a flat percentage of the award. For a criticism of the modified contingency fee
approach, see K. Roach, supra note 11 at 402-03. See, however, Crown Bay Hotel Ltd. Partnership v.
Zurich Indemnity Co. of Canada (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 83 (Gen. Div.) in which Winkler J. held that a
contingency fee based on a percentage of a settlement is within the contemplation of the Class
Proceedings Act.
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D. Comparison to Investor Financing
Investor financing is similar in many ways to the three models of
financing litigation set out above. Legal aid models are akin to the
financing of litigation by third-party investors in that the government,
which has no direct stake in the lawsuit, funds the costs of the litigation.
A key difference is that the third-party investor is motivated to provide
the funds by an expectation of a positive return, while the government
has no expectation of monetary return. Public litigation subsidy funds
are also similar in structure and operation to financing by third-party
investors. Contingency fee arrangements are simply a form of investor
financing where the class of investors is limited to lawyers. The
difference is that the lawyer retained provides services, rather than the
funds necessary to procure such services, in exchange for a share in the-
lawsuit.
However, the scope of these funding models in redressing
economic barriers to the civil justice system is limited, and investor
financing could nicely complement them. Legal aid is not effective in
reducing economic barriers to the civil justice system, even for the very
poor. 24 First, the financial eligibility criteria are very restrictive, so only
the veiy poor have access to legal aid. Second, the legal aid plan
administrators prioritize legal claims and place emphasis on granting
certificates for criminal matters. Of certificates issued in 1996-1997, 69
per cent were for criminal matters, 19 per cent for family, 7 per cent for
immigration and refugee, and 5 per cent for "other civil"25 matters.
While "other civil" matters include tort, contract, consumer,
administrative, landlord and tenant, social assistance, and workers'
compensation, 26 the 1997 Annual Report for the Ontario Legal Aid Plan
states that "priority in 'other civil' law cases is limited to civil sexual
assault, mental health, disability benefits, parole or prison matters and
poverty law cases, such as Workers' Compensation, Social Assistance
24 The legal aid crisis that occurred in Ontario recently is well documented, and various
studies outline reforms, some of which have been accepted by the Law Society of Upper Canada
and the Ontario government. See McCamus Report, supra note 1; and Civil Justice Review, supra
note 1.
25 Law Society of Upper Canada, Ontario LegalAid Plan: Annual Report, 1997 (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 1997) at 5.
26 Ibid. at 12. See, however, the McCamus Report, supra note 1 at 215-25, which recognizes
that matters falling within the "other civil" category may involve legal issues that have "a serious
impact on an individual" and recommends a number of options (including regulated contingent fee
arrangements and a contingency legal aid fund) outside the traditional legal aid system to increase
access to the civil justice system in these areas.
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Review Board and landlord and tenant." 27 As a result, there is little or
no coverage for civil cases involving personal injury based on contract or
tort. Ian Morrison and Janet Mosher note that as of October 1994,
"legal aid coverage for all personal injury actions (motor vehicle, slip
and fall, medical malpractice, etc.) was virtually eliminated." 28 The
ability of public litigation subsidy funds to achieve the goal of greater
accessibility to the courts is similarly limited. First, by its definition, the
Ontario Class Proceedings Fund is limited to financing class action
litigation and thus many meritorious individual cases are excluded from
receiving this public subsidy. Second, the Fund does not provide
assistance with lawyers' fees, which are much larger than disbursements
and generally the largest economic barrier to litigation.29 In contrast,
third-party investors would provide funding for legal fees as well as
disbursements. Third, the fact that reimbursement to the fund in the
event of success is set at 10 per cent is inefficient because the strength of
the particular action is not taken into account. Certain lawsuits might
warrant a return of less than 10 per cent if the factual and legal issues
are relatively straightforward, and thus settlement is almost guaranteed.
Other lawsuits might warrant a higher return if the facts or legal issues
are more complex, and thus success is not as certain. A scheme whereby
third-party investors finance lawsuits, in contrast, would allow the parties
to negotiate a reasonable return in light of the particular risks of the
lawsuit. Finally, the Fund's capital base is only $500,000, which is not a
large sum given the above discussion of the costs of litigation. From
1994 to 1997, the total amount awarded has only been $121,832.30 In
comparison, it would appear that private investor financing can raise
much more capital.31
Similarly, that contingency fee arrangements are only limited to
lawyers has several disadvantages when compared with the wider
potential class of private investors. Only lawyers who have an
2 7 Supra note 25 at 12.
28 Morrison & Mosher, supra note 9 at 659.
29 Note that the Quebec Fund, in contrast, provides assistance for lawyers' fees. See supra
note 15.
30 $9,884 was awarded in 1994; $29,889 in 1995; $82,059 in 1997; and no applications were
awarded funding in 1996. See The Law Foundation of Ontario, 1995Annual Report (Toronto: The
Law Foundation of Ontario, 1996) at 6; and The Law Foundation of Ontario, 1997Annual Report
(Toronto: The Law Foundation of Ontario, 1998) at 4.
31 See notes 97-99, infra, and accompanying text for a discussion of Nantais, in which $350,000
was raised from a small handful of wealthy investors, more than two-thirds the total capital of the
Fund.
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entrepreneurial inclination and thus are willing to accept a significant
degree of risk will agree to provide their services on a contingency basis.
This limits the pool of lawyers significantly. Even those lawyers who are
willing to work on a contingency fee basis will be selective in the cases
they pursue since their livelihood is at stake. They are likely to take on
cases that have a greater likelihood of success, and turn down those
which might be meritorious but are less certain to be successful. In
contrast, private investors may be less risk-averse in financing cases,
because they will be investing from their savings. In addition, third-party
investors may be better bearers of risk and better at risk diversification
than lawyers or their law firms.32 As a result, investors may be willing to
finance cases that lawyers may not be prepared to accept on a
contingency basis3 3
The conclusion reached from the above comparisons is that
investor financing may have a useful role to play by plugging the gaps
left by established financing arrangements.
III. MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY
A. Definition and Histoty
Halsbuiy defines maintenance and champerty as follows:
Maintenance may be defined as the giving of assistance or encouragement to one of the
parties to the litigation by a person who has neither an interest in litigation nor any other
motive recognized by the law as justifying his interference. Champerty is a particular
kind of maintenance, namely maintenance of an action in consideration of a promise to
give the maintainer a share in the proceeds or subject matter of the action.34
As a general matter, champertous agreements are void at
common law and they are considered to be against public policy in
Canada. In the late nineteenth century, Ontario codified the law
32 Lawyers acting on a contingent basis often experience cash flow problems and may have
difficulty paying out disbursement and fixed monthly expenses; in these situations investors would
be in a position to finance the litigation.
33 The fact that lawyers may not be willing to assume the entire risk of loss associated with a
case is highlighted in Nantais, in which the plaintiffs lawyer could have financed the entire litigation
through a contingency fee arrangement, but instead preferred to shift a portion of the risk to private
investors. See notes 97-99, infra, and accompanying text.
34 Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, ed., Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 9, 4th ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1974) at 272, as cited in Buday v. Locator of Missing Heirs Inc. (1993), 16 O.R. (3d)
257 at 262 (C.A.) [hereinafter Buday].
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relating to champerty in a statute which remains in full force and effect
today.35 An Act Respecting Champerty reads:
1. Champertors be they that move pleas and suits, or cause to be moved, either by their
own procurement, or by others, and sue them at their proper costs, for to have part of the
land in variance, or part of the gains.
2. All champertous agreements are forbidden, and invalid.3 6
Maintenance and champerty are also torts at common law,
making the third party liable to the defendant to the action for special
damages suffered as a result of the third party's financial assistance,3 7
including the costs of defending the lawsuit38 The defendant to the
action cannot move to stay the action on the basis of the third party's
maintenance since the maintainer is not a party to the action before the
courts, and maintenance is not considered a defence to the merits of an
action.39
Maintenance and champerty were also common law criminal
offences in Canada until 1953 when what is now section 9 was added to
the Criminal Code4O abolishing common law offences. The Criminal
Code Revision Committee recommended their abolition on the basis
that these crimes were "obsolete and archaic." 41
.35 The laws of maintenance and champerty are rooted in conspiracy and abuse of process, and
originally invalidated the sale of land where title was in dispute. See P.H. Winfield, The Histoty of
Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921) at 131-60;
E.H. Bodkin, The Law of Maintenance and Champerty (London: Stevens and Sons, 1935); and M.
Radin, "Maintenance by Champerty" (1935) 24 Cal. L. Rev. 48 for a history of the laws against
maintenance and champerty.
36 R.S.O. 1897, c. 327, ss. 1-2.
3 7Oram v. Hutt, [1914] 1 Ch. 98 (C.A.).
38 See Alabaster v. Harness, [1895] 1 *Q.B. 339 (C.A.), cited with approval in Nevsvander v.
Giegerich (1907), 39 S.C.R. 354 [hereinafter Newsvander] in which the Supreme Court of Canada
stated at 359 [emphasis in original]: "That costs of defending a suit which has been improperly
maintained may be recovered in an action of maintenance is true."
39 See Kroeker v. Harkema Express Lines Ltd. (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 210 (H.C.); and Davey v.
Tallon, [1928] 3 W.W.R. 215 (Man. KB.), aff'd [1929] 1 W.W.R. 171 (Man. C.A.).
40 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 9, amending S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 8.
41 A.J. McLeod & J.C. Martin, "Offences and Punishments Under the New Criminal Code"
(1955) 33 Can. Bar Rev. 20 at 23-24. For case law on the criminal offence of champerty, see
Goodman v. The King, [1939] S.C.R. 446, rev'g (1938), 66 B.R. 1 (C.A.) [hereinafter Goodman]; R.
v. Bordoff (1938), 70 C.C.C. 35 (C.S.P.); and Colville v. Small (1910), 22 O.L.R. 33 (H.C.J.), aff'd
(1910), 22 O.L.R. 426 (Div. Ct.).
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B. The Requirements of Maintenance and Champerty
In determining whether an agreement falls within the definition
of maintenance and champerty, motive is central. The fact that one is
financing a lawsuit is itself insufficient to constitute maintenance.
Similarly, the fact that there is an agreement to finance a lawsuit in
exchange for a share of the proceeds is in itself insufficiet to constitute
champerty. "Motive is relevant and has been relied on by the courts in
considering the common law rule (or definition) of champerty
particularly in creating exceptions to its application."42 As the Privy
Council put it in an 1860 decision: "[Champerty and maintenance] must
be something against good policy and justice, something tending to
promote unnecessary litigation, something that in a legal sense is immoral
and to the constitution of which a bad motive in the same sense is
necessary."43 Thus, both maintenance and champerty require proof of an
improper motive in providing the financial assistance, whether it is
malicious or officious intermeddling, a stirring up of strife (for vexation
or delay), or some other impropriety, 44 and both contemplate an
uninterested third party or a stranger becoming involved in the litigation
of others.45 It also appears that the third party, in addition to providing
the financial assistance, must cause the action to be commenced,
aggravated, or enlarged in some way. Proof that the plaintiff has already
consulted with a lawyer, although not required, would indicate that the
plaintiff was predisposed to pursuing a legal claim and that the third
party was not intermeddling.46
C. Policy Justifications
The original policy rationale against maintenance and champerty
was an attempt to minimize abusive interference in litigation by wealthy
and powerful members of society. The Ontario Law Reform
42S. vK (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 111 at 116 (Dist. Ct.).
43 Fischer v. Kamala Naicher (1860), 8 Moo. Ind. App. 170 at 187 (P.C.) [emphasis added],
quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Newsiwander, supra note 38 at 360.
4 4 Buday, supra note 34.
45 See American Home Assurance Co. v. Brett Pontiac Buick GMC Ltd. (No. 2) (1992), 116
N.S.R. (2d) 319 (C.A.), rev'g (4 March 1992), Doe. S.H. 77076 (T.D.) [hereinafterAmerican Home
Assurance].
46 See Buday, supra note 34 at 267; and Goodman, supra note 41 at 449.
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Commission Report on Class Actions describes the historical roots of the
doctrines against maintenance and champerty as follows:
Rules against maintenance and champerty were introduced over 700 years ago in
response to abusive interference in the legal system by powerful royal officials and
nobles. Although the particular abuses against which the prohibitions were directed had
been cured by the time of the Tudors, the rules continued to survive. In modern
decisions concerning maintenance, courts do not refer to the mediaeval origins of the
doctrine, but justify its continued existence on the basis of public policy considerations,
The antipathy of the courts to champertous agreements similarly is supported by policy
concerns.
4 7
More contemporary justifications of the doctrines focus on the
perceived abuses to the administration of justice. As Lord Denning
stated in Re Trepca Mines Ltd. (No. 2):
The reason why the common law condemns champerty is because of the abuses to which
it may give rise. The common law fears that the champertous maintainer might be
tempted, for his own personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even
to suborn witnesses. These fears may be exaggerated; but, be that so or not, the law for
centuries has declared champerty to be unlawful, and we cannot do otherwise than
enforce the law.48
While this passage is a stark pronouncement of the abuses that will
result if champertous agreements are recognized at law, judicial
decisions do not'appear to critically analyze the extent of these perceived
abuses. As will be discussed in Part IV, below, these concerns appear to
be overstated.
D. Exceptions to the General Rule
Recognizing competing and overriding public policies, courts
have over time carved out numerous exceptions to the general rules
against maintenance and champerty. The courts will not find a third
party's financial assistance to be maintenance or champerty where the
third party's motive can be characterized as proper or legitimate.
47 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions, vol. 3 (Toronto: Ministry of the
Attorney General, 1982) at 717.
48 [19631 Ch. 199 at 219 (C.A.).
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1. Charity and compassion
An exemption to maintenance is recognized for the provision of
financial assistance by third parties for charitable and compassionate
reasons. 49 Kerwin J., in Goodman v. R.,SO quoted approvingly from Lord
Abinger's judgment in Findon v. Parker where he said:
I do not like to give an opinion upon an abstract case, and therefore am not desirous to
consider it; but if a man were to see a poor person in the street oppressed and abused,
and without the means of obtaining redress, and furnished him with money or employed
an attorney to obtain redress for his wrongs, it would require a very strong argument to
convince me that that man could be said to be stirring up litigation and strife, and to be
guilty of the crime of maintenance; I am not prepared to say, that, in modern times,
Courts of justice ought to come to that conclusion. However, I give no opinion upon that
point.51
2. Legitimate common interest
Courts have also created an exception to maintenance for third
parties such as near relatives52 who have a legitimate common interest
with the party to the lawsuit. However, where the third party receives a
share of the proceeds, courts have held such agreements to be
champertous. 53
49 See Newivswander, supra note 38 at 362; and Carlson v. Chambers, [1947] 1 W.W.R. 353
(Sask. K.B.). See also Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 in which the Supreme Court of Canada
held that a religious society financially supporting litigation of a member's divorce proceedings,
involving freedom of religion and expression issues, did not constitute maintenance. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, to argue charity in relation to a champertous agreement since the third
party has negotiated a right to share in the proceeds of the litigation.
50 Goodman, supra note 41 at 450.
51 (1843), 11 M. & W. 675 at 682-83 (Ex. Ct.).
52 See Bradlaugh v. Newdegate (1883), 11 Q.B.D. I at 11 (C.A.) per Lord Coleridge; assistance
in paying for litigation costs is likely extremely common given that an individual will often turn to a
family member to pay for the costs of the litigation. Bogart & Vidmar, supra note 7 at 33, examined
problems and experience with the Ontario civil justice system and found that in 37 per cent of cases,
legal fees were paid for by the concerned litigant or another member of their household. Members
of one's household are likely to be members of one's immediate family. Thus, despite the rules
against maintenance and champerty in the context of relatives, financial assistance by relatives is
very frequent, and monitoring and enforcement of the common law rules very difficult. Since it
appears that the issue of relatives maintaining lawsuits has not been applied in recent times and has
not arisen before the courts in the last 100 years, the courts simply accept this arrangement as a
reality of litigation.
53 See Hutley v. Hutley (1873), L.R. 8 Q.B. 112.
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3. Commercial interests
a) Pre-existing commercial interest
Under the rationale of a public policy which favours facilitating
commercial transactions, courts have also upheld financing agreements
where a third party can be characterized as having a genuine pre-existing
commercial interest in the litigation.5 4 The pre-existing business interest
exception has, for example, justified various arrangements in the
insurance industry, such as subrogation, which might otherwise be
considered maintenance or champerty.SS
Illustrative of the pre-existing commercial interest exception is
the case of American Home Assurance.S6 The Appeal Division of the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court, using this exception, held that Brett
Pontiac, an automobile dealership, did not violate the doctrines against
maintenance and champerty when it encouraged and assisted its
customers in bringing lawsuits for unpaid repair claims against an
extended warranty provider, American Home Assurance Co., on
vehicles it had sold to them. The court reasoned that Brett Pontiac,
having sold the extended warranties, had a genuine pre-existing interest
in the outcome of the actions brought by its customers. In reaching its
decision, the court also took into account the inequality of financial and
bargaining positions between the individual customers and American
Home Assurance Co. The court stated:
Having involved [its customers] with an administrator of service contracts which was no
longer honouring claims, it was perfectly reasonable for [the car dealership] to step in to
assist [them] in an unequal contest with [an] international insurance corporation which had
insured the contracts. 57
54 It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether this and other exceptions actually
increase economic efficiency by maximizing general welfare or rather reflect special interest groups
being favoured in rule-making.
55 See Societa Italiana Assicurazioni Trasporti v. Canadian Marine Undenrwiters Ltd. (1994), 26
C.C.L.I. (2d) 283 (Ont. Gen. Div.); and Frederickson v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (1986),
17 C.C.L.I. 194 (B.C.C.A).
56 Supra note 45.
5 7 1bML at 326 [emphasis added].
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b) Legitimate business arrangement
Courts have also carved out an exception for contracts where the
third party can be characterized as having a legitimate business
arrangement with the potential plaintiff. In Buday v. Locator of Missing
Heirs Inc.,58 the Ontario Court of Appeal relied on this exception to
justify an agreement whereby Locator of Missing Heirs ("Locator")
agreed to assist the Ollmann family in establishing their rights in a
mining claim in exchange for 30 per cent of their interest if successful.
Locator was successful in establishing the Ollmanns' claim. However,
the Ollmanns refused to assign 30 per cent of their interest to Locator as
agreed, and sought a declaration that the agreement was champertous.
The court held that the agreement was not champertous because
Locator did not stir up litigation; it simply entered into a bona fide
business arrangement to assist the Ollmann family in establishinig what
they believed was a valid mining claim.
In determining whether a legitimate business arrangement
existed between the parties, the court examined whether the exchange
was mutually beneficial. It noted that the Ollmanns contacted Locator,
that the principal of Locator had over thirty years' experience in the
industry, that the parties formalized their relationship in a written
contract which they labelled a "joint venture" agreement, and that the
Ollmann family obtained independent legal advice before signing the
agreement. In reaching his decision, Griffiths J.A. also referred to the
affidavit testimony of the president of Locator, Howes, concerning his
motivations for assisting the Ollmanns. Griffiths J.A. wrote:
Howes was familiar with the Williams mine which is the largest gold mine in Canada. He
was particularly interested in assisting the Ollmann family in proving their claim because,
as he stated in his affidavit, "the Ollmann saga had a lot of real 'human interest' appeal to
me, as my favourite cases are ones in which I can help economically disadvantaped
people to obtain their rightful inheritances from large corporations." 5 9
The fact that the Ollmann family had voluntarily and knowledgeably
entered into the agreement, and had received what they had bargained
for, was significant in the court's determination that the agreement was
not champertous. The fact that the Ollmanns did not come to court with
clean hands assisted in tilting the equities in favour of Locator and also
likely had an impact upon the court's determination. Thus, it appears
58 Buday, supra note 34.
5 9 Ibid at 261.
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that the court examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the transaction in deciding that the agreement was not champertous.
In Pielak v. Crown Forest Industries Ltd.,60 the legitimate business
interest exception was used to uphold an arrangement to recover sales
tax made between Crown Forest and Pielak, a (non-lawyer) tax expert,
for which Pielak would retain 40 per cent of the recovery. The British
Columbia Supreme Court held that the agreement was not champertous,
reasoning that the purpose of the contract was to ensure that the
appropriate amount of tax had been paid, and that such a purpose did
not constitute officious intermeddling or the stirring up of strife. In
reaching its decision, the court noted the commercial value of the
exchange and stated that "the subject matter of the tax is a highly
specialized area and the service offered by the plaintiff was needed by
the defendants and so had a legitimate commercial value." 61 The court
also examined the relative bargaining power of the parties and
concluded that both parties were "mature and sophisticated,"62 so that
Pielak's remuneration was "likely to be fair and not oppressive" 63 to
Crown Forest's interests. On the whole, the court was satisfied with the
fairness and reasonableness of the transaction.
However, in an earlier decision of the Ontario High Court, a
similar agreement to that in Pielak was held to be champertous. In
Smythers v. Armstrong,64 residential tenants entered into contracts with a
third party who assisted the tenants in recovering rent in exchange for 50
per cent of the amount recovered. The court held that the third party's
motive was to "officiously intermeddle in [the] disputes of others." 65 In
quoting from the written agreement, the court noted a clause which
made the third party the agent for the tenants and authorized him to
accept any settlement that the agent "in his absolute discretion considers
just or reasonable" and that this was binding on all parties.6 6 The court
appeared to be concerned that the tenants were dominated by the third
party, and thus concluded that there was no legitimate business
arrangement.
60 (1992), 64 B.C.L.R. (2d) 207 (S.C.) [hereinafter Pielak].
61 Ibid. at 225.
6 2 Jbid.
63 Ibid. at 226.
64 (1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 753 (H.C.J.) [hereinafter Srnythers].
65 Ibid. at 757.
66 Ibid. at 756.
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How does one reconcile Smythers with Buday and Pielak? As in
Buday and Pielak, the court in Smythers analyzed the totality of the
transaction. However, the court came to a different conclusion in
Smythers because of its concern that the third party in question was
taking advantage of its position vis-d-vis the tenants. It also appears that
the court was concerned about the value added by the third party.
Unlike the third-party experts in Buday and Pielak, the third party in this
situation was not providing any special expert assistance.
4. Legislative exceptions
In addition to judicially created exceptions, various legislative
enactments have validated arrangements which might otherwise be
considered maintenance or champerty. For example, assignments of
choses-in-action and accounts receivable were legalized in order to
promote commerce. Ontario passedAnAct to make Debts and Choses in
action assignable at Law67 in 1872 to recognize such assignments. The
business of factoring, which is the wholesale purchase and sale of a
company's accounts receivables, and the process of securitization, which
is the sale of a future income stream, would not have developed but for
these legislative amendments.68
Another example is contingency fees. Contingency
arrangements for legal work were historically prohibited by the common
law definitions of champerty, statutory definitions of champerty, and
legislation governing lawyers.69 With the exception of Ontario, all the
provinces have now legislatively permitted contingency fee arrangements
between solicitors and clients in order to increase access to justice.70 In
Ontario, contingency fees were legalized only in relation to class actions
in 1992 when the Class Proceedings Act was enacted.71
6 7 R.S.O 1877, c. 116, ss. 6-12, amending 1872,35 Vic., c. 12.
68 See A.P. Bell, Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland (London:
Butterworths, 1989) at 364.
69 See Solicitor's Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-15, s. 28.
70 See Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct, 1987 c. XI, para. 10.
71 The Class Proceedings Act, supra note 14, s. 33(1) reads:
Despite the Solicitors Act and An Act respecting Champerty, being chapter 327 of Revised
Statutes of Ontario, 1897, a solicitor and a representative party may enter into a written
agreement providing for payment of fees and disbursements only in the event of success
in a class proceeding.
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E. Other jurisdictions
In England, the torts of maintenance and champerty were
abolished in the 1960s upon the recommendation of the Law
Commission which concluded that an action for damages for
maintenance and champerty no longer served any useful purpose.
Maintenance and champerty were also abolished as criminal offences in
England in the 1960s.72 However, the common law doctrine invalidating
champertous contracts continues to exist.73
A number of different approaches have developed in the United
States to deal with maintenance and champerty. Some states such as
Pennsylvania have maintained the common law prohibitions against
champertous agreements, while the courts of other states like California
have held that champertous agreements may be contrary to public
policy.74 Yet other states such as New York have adopted statutes
declaring champertous agreements void.7 5 Civil law jurisdictions
including Puerto Rico and Louisiana have adopted an approach whereby
if a plaintiff sells all or a portion of a lawsuit to a third party, the
defendant may settle the litigation with the plaintiff by reimbursing the
third party for the amount paid by him or her with interest and costs.76
IV. APPLICATION OF MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY TO
INVESTOR FINANCING OF LITIGATION
A. Relevance to Investor Financing
The current status of the doctrines against maintenance and
champerty is relevant to the analysis of investor financing of lawsuits in
relation to the enforceabilty of the contract between a plaintiff and
72 U.K., The Law Commission, Proposals for Refonn of the Law Relating to Maintenance atnd
Champerty (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966) at para. 7.
73 See Hill v. Archbold, [1968] 1 Q.B. 686 (C.A.).
74 For a more detailed review of the approaches to modern champerty law in the United
States, see A. Dobner, "Litigation for Sale" (1996) 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1529 at 1547-55; S. Lorde
Martin, "Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?" (1992) 30 Am.
Bus. L.J. 485 at 488-89; and D.L. Abraham, "Investor-Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove
Two Barriers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing" (1992) 43 Syracuse L. Rev. 1297 at
1303-05.
75 Dobner, supra note 74 at 1548.
76 Ibid. at 1552.
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third-party investors. For example, a plaintiff to a lawsuit who enters
into a financing agreement with a third-party investor, and is successful
in the litigation, could refuse to pay the third-party investor a share of
the proceeds by attempting to have the agreement between them
declared champertous by the courts, and thus illegal and void.
Additionally, the defendant to a lawsuit could not plead maintenance or
champerty as a defence to the litigation, but could commence an action
in tort against the third-party investor if special damages have been
suffered as a result of the maintenance, although admittedly, these
actions are rare.
These additional risks, in all probability, would increase the rate
of return demanded by the investor financing a lawsuit. It is therefore
an important question as to whether investor financing of lawsuits would
be considered champertous, and thus invalid and unenforceable
contracts.
B. Application-Improper Motive or Justifiable Exception?
Can an argument be made that the doctrines against
maintenance and champerty would not invalidate contracts made
between plaintiffs and investors to the litigation? The answer will
depend upon whether the third-party investor's interference can be
characterized as improper, or rather, as falling within a recognized
exception to the doctrines against maintenance and champerty.
The charitable and compassionate exception would not be
helpful in this context given the assumption that investors are financing
lawsuits for economic gain. The legitimate common-interest exception
for close relatives is too narrow to have widespread effect on the
litigation landscape. The pre-existing commercial-interest exception
would be equally impractical because it limits the class of investors that
can finance a litigation, and thus is not helpful in achieving the goal of
greater access to the civil justice system.
The broadest and most viable exception is the legitimate business
interest exception. A strong argument can be made that the plaintiff and
the third-party investor are involved in a mutually beneficial exchange
whereby the plaintiff obtains the funds required to pursue the litigation
and the third-party investor uses surplus funds with the expectation of a
return for investing in the litigation. This reasoning was adopted by the
courts in Pielak and Buday. Nevertheless, the Smythers decision
indicates that this rationale will only be accepted by the courts after
scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the financing arrangement.
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Thus, the analysis is not straightforward. An analysis of the case law
suggests that courts will consider a number of factors, including the
following:
Merits of the plaintiffs lawsuit-the less meritorious the
plaintiffs suit, the more likely the third party's financial
assistance will be seen as intermeddling, as in Smith, below. 77
Fairness and reasonableness of the arrangement as between the
plaintiff and the third-party investor-if the parties can be
viewed as relative equals with respect to their ability to bargain,
the greater the likelihood a court will find the third party's
assistance as proper. Additionally, the courts will examine the
actual bargain struck to ensure that it is not unreasonable, and
that it is reflective of equality of information and bargaining
power between the parties.
Abuses in relation to champerty and maintenance-do the facts
in the particular circumstances actually lead to the evils which
the doctrines against champerty and maintenance are designed
to avoid?
Relative strength of the plaintiff and the defendant to the
lawsuit--courts will consider the financial and other inequalities
between the plaintiff and the defendant in favour of validating
the arrangement between the plaintiff and the third party, as in
American Home Assurance.
Third party's ostensible motive in providing financial assistance
-courts are more willing to uphold agreements where a third
party claims a motive of providing assistance to help the
disadvantaged, as in Buday, despite recognition by the courts that
the third party's primary motive is to profit from the financing.
Who brought the action to have the agreement declared
champertous-if the litigant after succeeding wishes to have the
court declare the agreement invalid, the fact that the litigant is
not going to court with clean hands, as in Buday, will have an
impact upon the court's exercise of its equitable jurisdiction.
Although this list of factors can be extracted from the cases,
there is no principled discussion in the decisions of the relevance of
these factors to maintenance and champerty, and the weight to be
accorded to each of them. Thus, any conclusion as to how the courts will
decide whether investor financing of a lawsuit constitutes maintenance
7 7 See infra note 78.
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or champerty must remain speculative. The outcome will depend on the
facts and merits of the particular case and the conduct of the parties
involved.
C. Case Law on Investor Financed Litigation
While the case law discussed above involved third parties who
provided services in exchange for a share of the proceeds of the lawsuit,
the following cases involve third parties whose role is strictly to provide
the monies necessary to finance the litigation in return for a share of any
award.
In Smith v. Canadian Tire Acceptance Ltd.,78 the court was
critical of investor financing of lawsuits. The Borrowers' Action Society
("Society") was established by Larry Whaley to organize and promote
class action lawsuits on behalf of credit customers against Canadian
corporations that were alleged to have contravened the Interest Act.79
The Society decided to pursue its first case against Canadian Tire
Acceptance Corporation. The Society solicited funds to finance the
litigation from Canadian Tire credit card holders. Potential investors
were invited to register with the Society and purchase shares in the class
action for an initial fee of $100, and subsequent shares for $50 each.80
The Society represented to investors that if the lawsuit was successful,
they would receive a proportionate share of the contingent fee awarded
by the court, above and beyond any damages award. The Society was to
receive 10 per cent of the contingency fee award, as a promoter's fee,
prior to any distribution to the investors.81
The Society promoted the financing scheme through radio,
television, and newspaper advertisements, and a video infomercial
presented in major cities throughout Canada.82 The Society marketed
the class action as the "Borrowers' Action Society's Billion Dollar Class
Action"83 and enticed potential investors by claiming: "Collect your
78 (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 433 (Gen. Div.), affd (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 94 (C.A.) [hereinafter
Smith (Motion for Costs)]. See also G. Watson, "A 'Stocktaking' of Class Proceedings in Ontario: Is
the Price Wrong?" (June 1998) [unpublished, archived at Osgoode Hall Law School] at 13-15 for an
analysis of Smith.
79 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-15.
80 Smith (Motion for Costs), supra note 78 at 437.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
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share of a Billion Dollar Reward." One advertisement even stated that
investors "can participate at no risk,"8 4 while another asked: "Would you
risk $100 on the chance you will get back up to $64,000? $150 for a
chance at double that? Sounds like a get-rich quick scam? It's not, it's a
class action."85
One thousand, seven hundred and fifty people registered with
the Society.8 6  The class action brought against Canadian Tire
Acceptance Corporation was dismissed on a motion for summary
judgment.8 7 Canadian Tire Acceptance Corporation then moved for an
order that the costs of the action be paid by Whaley and the Society,
even though they were not named parties to the action. The court held
that costs should be awarded against Whaley and the Society on a
solicitor-client scale.88 While the direct issue before the court was the
award of costs against a non-party, the court commented that the
conduct of Whaley and the Society amounted to maintenance and
champerty. The court was critical of Whaley and the Society, and stated
that "their conduct in instigating, promoting, controlling and raising
funds to support this lawsuit was improper."8 9 The court was clearly
disturbed by the fact that Whaley and the Society made extravagant
claims with respect to the returns investors would receive without having
obtained a legal opinion regarding the propriety of the scheme; and
noted that scheme was tantamount to the marketing and selling of
shares to the public in apparent violation of securities laws.90 The court
described Whaley and the Society's conduct as "presumptuous" and
"contumacious."91 In a tone of utter disapproval, the court concluded by
stating: "This scheme was ill-founded and flawed both conceptually and
in law. The promises of financial gain for registrants were irresponsible,
and the conduct of the Society and Mr. Whaley iri attempting to gain
financially from the action was akin to maintenance and champerty." 92
84 Ibid- at 438.
8 5 Ibid. at 439.
8 6 Ibid. at 437.
87 (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 610 (Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Smith (Summary JudgmennO].
88 Smith (Motion for Costs), supra note 78 at 451.
89 Ibid. at 440.
9 0 Ibid. at 448.
91 Ibid. at 450.
92 Ibid. at 448.
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Given that Whaley and the Society had conceded that they were
selling shares, the fact that they had not complied with relevant
securities laws by issuing a prospectus (since they were offering their
shares to the public), appears to have weighed heavily in the court's
decision. Had they complied with securities laws and provided full, fair
and true disclosure with respect to the nature of the investment and its
risks (in contrast to the substantial misrepresentations they appear to
have made), the court, in all likelihood, would not have characterized
their conduct as improper. Furthermore, the fact that the lawsuit was
dismissed on a motion for summary judgment affected the court's
decision because it indicated that the lawsuit lacked merit.93 If the
Society's lawsuit had merit, it is quite possible that the court, in addition
to considering other redeeming factors, would not have been so critical
of their actions. For these reasons, Smith should not be viewed as a
determinative statement on the legality of investor financed lawsuits.
In addition, the precedential value of Smith on this issue is
reduced by the existence of two decisions which support the financing of
lawsuits by third-party investors. In Wiegand v. Huberman,94 Berger J. of
the British Columbia Supreme Court held that the borrowing of money
to finance a lawsuit where the parties agreed that the loan would be
repaid by a share in the proceeds of the litigation did not constitute
champerty. The Hubermans required financial assistance to allow them
to bring an oppression action against majority shareholders in
companies in which they held shares. They sought the assistance of
Wiegand, who provided them with $31,500 in exchange for repayment of
the loan and 10 per cent of the proceeds of the litigation. The
Hubermans did not proceed with the litigation, and Wiegand sought the
court's assistance to recover his loan. The court rejected the
Hubermans' defence of maintenance and champerty by holding that
there was no element of officiousness in Wiegand's actions. Berger J.
stated:
[The third-party investor] did not stir up litigation. He financed it, at the request of the
defendants. They had no funds; they would not have been able to pursue the litigation
without financial assistance. It would be unjust to say that anyone who lent money to the
[Hubermans] in these circumstances would have no right under the law to get his money
back if the litigation failed or to insist upon his share of the proceeds if it succeeded. 9 5
93 Smith (Summary Judgment), supra note 87 at 630.
94 (1979), 18 B.C.L.R. 102 (S.C.).
95 Ibid. at 104.
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Berger J. also denounced the traditional policy justifications for
champerty and maintenance discussed earlier, favouring instead a policy
of access to the courts, and stated:
The old English cases indicate that the courts used to seek to discourage litigation. In
Canada, while the courts do not seek to encourage litigation, they do not want to place
any obstacles in the way of an aggrieved citizen bringing a lawsuit which on legal advice
he wishes to bring. Given the costs of litigation, it may be necessary to obtain such
assistance.96
In the recent decision of Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietay
(Canada) Ltd.,97 a class action lawsuit against the manufacturer of a
defective pacemaker, the investor financing scheme had the apparent
approval of the trial judge. A handful of wealthy individuals contributed
a total of $350,000 to assist in the financing of the lawsuit. The
arrangement was that if the litigation succeeded, the investors were to
receive re-payment of their initial investment as well as 20 per cent
annual interest on their investment, with priority over all other parties,
including the plaintiffs. If the lawsuit failed, the investors would have
lost their entire investment. The case settled for $23.5 million three
years after commencement of the suit, and the investors were
compensated according to the agreement. The investor financing
scheme was given approval in Nantais, in contrast to Smith, likely
because there was compliance with the relevant securities laws,98 the
return on the investment was reasonable to both the investors and the
plaintiffs, and the lawsuit appeared to be meritorious. 99 In Smith, the
conduct was so egregious that it was not difficult for the court to classify
it as improper, unlike Nantais, which appears to have had more
tempered facts.
D. U.S. Experience in Investor Financed Litigation
The United States has had more experience than Canada with
the financing of litigation by third-party investors. For example, a
number of savings and loan institutions have sold shares in litigation that
96 Ibid.
9 7 Supra note 4. See V. Lawton, "Investors Betting Lawsuits Will Bring Big Payoffs" The
Toronto Star (22 February 1998) A3.
98 See Part V, below, for a discussion of applicable securities laws, and a discussion of the
securities laws that likely applied to this decision.
9 9 See Lawton, supra note 97; and Nantais, supra note 4.
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is being pursued against the Government of the United States in relation
to its alleged breaches of contract resulting from the 1980's savings and
loan crisis.100 These securities are listed on the NASDAQ and are known
by various names including litigation tracking warrants, contingent
payment rights, and contingent litigation recovery participation
interests.l01
Businesses that invest in litigation have also developed.1 02
Several investment firms have opened up that finance patent
litigation. 03 One such business, Refac Technologies, invests in disputed
patent infringement ligitation and is listed on the American Stock
Exchange. 0 4 The courts ,have been reluctant to welcome Refac's entry
into the litigation system. In one case in which Refac financed litigation,
the court imposed sanctions of over $200,000 on the basis that the
appeal filed by Refac was frivolous.I05 In another case where it was held
that the litigation was frivolous, the court ordered Refac to pay $2.5
million for the defendants' attorney fees.106
E. Conclusion
The courts' fact-based inquiry of maintenance and champerty
would appear at first to be sensible. However, the lack of predictability
with respect to the courts' discretion imposes additional costs and risks
on the parties involved in investor financed lawsuits. For investor
financing to be viable, investors will want greater certainty regarding the
enforceability of their financing arrangement. Otherwise, investors will
demand a higher premium on their investment and the financing scheme
100 See P. Sweeney, "How to Win Big in Court and Never See a Lawyer" New York Times (1
November 1998) s. 3 at 10; and S. Labanton, "The Debacle that Buried Washington" New York
Tines (22 November 1998) s. 3 at 12.
101 Ibid.
102 See Killian v. Millard, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1601 at 1607 (1991) as cited in Dobner, supra note
74 at 1530.
103 Such firms include Intellectual Property Reserve Corp., WBX Partners, Patent Protection
Institute, Patent Enforcement Fund, and Intellectual Property Reserve. See L. Himelstein,
"Investors Wanted-For Lawsuits" Business Week (15 November 1993) 78.
104 See Dobner, supra note 74 at 1530.
105 Refac International, Ltd. v. Hitachi Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247 at 1256-57 (Fed. Cir. 1990) as cited
in Dobnersupra note 74 at 1530.
106 Refac International, Inc. v. IBM Corporation, 710 F. Supp. 569 at 570, n. 1 (D.N.J. 1989) as
cited in Dobner, supra note 74 at 1531.
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will be an unattractive option for most plaintiffs. Thus, rather than
subject parties to an expost review of the transaction by the courts, a
legislative pronouncement that such agreements are valid, subject to
clearly specified safeguards, would be most desirable. This conclusion is
reinforced by the fact that original public policy justifications for the
doctrines no longer appear persuasive and, upon scrutiny, the more
contemporary public policy arguments appear exaggerated.
Furthermore, the countervailing public policy of ensuring access to the
civil justice system outweighs any possible remaining force in the
contemporary justifications for retention of the doctrines against
maintenance and champerty.O 7 Concerns aboht the particular exchange
between the plaintiff and the third-party investor involving issues such as
voluntariness, relative bargaining power, and unfairness can be dealt
with under the equitable doctrine of unconscionability in contract law.108
In the absence of any clear judicial pronouncement that agreements
involving investor financing of lawsuits are valid and enforceable, the
common law doctrine invalidating champertous agreements should be
legislatively abolished, and the 1897 Act Respecting Champerty,O9
repealed. At a minimum, legislation should be implemented permitting
investor financed lawsuits, as was done in the area of contingency fees in
the Ontario Class Proceedings Act, specifically stating that such
agreements are valid despite the 1897 Act Respecting Champery and the
common law doctrines.1 10
V. REGULATION OF THE MARKET FOR
FINANCING LITIGATION
A. Protection of Investors-Securities Regulation
Securities laws are another potential regulatory barrier to the
development of investor financed lawsuits. An analysis of whether
investor financed lawsuits should require compliance with securities laws
follows. I reach the conclusion, based on doctrinal analysis and a strong
107 Ibid.
108 For a discussion of unconscionability, see generally, S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts,
3d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1993) at 434-546; and G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contracts in
Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at 313-40.
109 Supra note 36.
110 See supra note 71.
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public policy favouring protection of the investing public, that funding of
litigation by investors would be subject to securities laws, including the
issuance of a prospectus, unless the financing can fit under an
appropriate prospectus exemption. It is a legitimate question whether
certain aspects of securities regulation ought to be made more cost-
effective so that capital can be raised with greater ease. However, under
current law, investor financing will be cost-effective and practicable only
for lawsuits involving large claims, typically class actions, or alternatively
where investment fund companies are set up to act as clearinghouses for
individual claims.
B. The Prospectus Requirement
A prospectus is a detailed disclosure document which must be
provided to investors who purchase securities of a firm if securities
legislation so requires. The Ontario Securities Act requires that a
prospectus "shall provide full, true and plain disclosure of all material
facts relating to the securities issued or proposed to be distributed."]11
A prospectus must provide, among other facts, detailed and verifiable
information about the business and affairs of the issuer, and the risk
factors involved with the investment.
Section 53 of the osA offers the mechanism for the regulation of
the primary market for capital by the Ontario Securities Commission
(osc). It provides that:
No person or company shall trade in a security on his, her or its own account or on behalf
of any other person or company where such trade would be a distribution ofsuch security,
unless a preliminary prospectus and a prospectus have been filed and receipts thereof
obtained from the Director.1 12
The definition of security is the most important provision in the OSA
because all other sections are based on it. Thus whether a transaction
between a plaintiff and a third-party investor falls within the prospectus
requirement requires examining whether it would constitute a
security. 13
111 R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5, s. 56 [hereinafter osA].
112 Ibid. s. 53 [emphasis added].
113 For a discussion of the definition of security, see M. Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada
(Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 84-98; V.P. Alboini, Securities Law and Practice, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1984); D.L. Johnson & K. Doyle Rockwell, Canadian Securities Regulation, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1998) at 25-34; and F. lacobucci, "The Definition of Security for Purposes
of a Securities Act" in P. Anisman, ed., Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, vol. 3
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A broad definition of the concept of "security" is set out in
section 1(1) of the osA. The definition is sub-divided into sixteen
paragraphs and is non-exhaustive in nature.t 14 The broadest aspect of
the definition of security is "any investment contract," 1 5 a provision
which has been interpreted with a purposive analysis.1' 6 Canadian
regulators and courts have, in large part, accepted American
jurisprudence on this issue, given the similarities underlying the
legislative policies of Canadian and U.S. securities regulation1 7 and the
definition of security."18 The two leading U.S. cases are SEC v. W.J.
Howey119 and State of Hawaii v. Hawaii Market Center Inc.120
. In Howey, the United States Supreme Court held that the
definition of security ought to be broadly construed because of the policy
of investor protection underlying the Securities Act. In attempting to
define "investment contract," the Court reasoned that any definition
must permit the following:
[T]he fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to
the issuance of "the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within
the ordinary concept of a security."... It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle,
one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of money of others on the promise of profits. 12 1
(Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979) 221.
While the definitions of trade and distribution are also relevant to the analysis of whether
, a prospectus is required, their defining characteristics are much less analytical and controversial
than that of security.
Section 1(1)(e) of the osA defines a "trade" as "any sale, encumbrance, ... and any act,
advertisement, solicitation, conduct, negotiation in furtherance of any of the foregoing." This broad
definition results in practically any dealing with the transfer or potential transfer of a security
constituting a trade under the osA, with a notable exception being the purchase of a security.
Section 1(1) of the OSA defines distribution as "a trade in a security by the issuer that has not been
previously issued," which includes initial offerings made by an issuer.
114 For a criticism of the definition of security, see Anisman, supra note 113 at 33, where he
states that the sub-sections in the osA are a "heterogenous clutter" to which "the defining terms
seem to have been added piecemeal, and without much justification."
115 osA, supra note 111, s. 1 (1)(n).
116 See Pacific Coast Coin Exchange of Canada Ltd. v. O.S.C., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 112 at 126, aff'g
(1976), 8 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.), affg (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 395 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Pacific Coast].
117 Ibid.
118 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.S. § 77b(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991 ) reads: "The term 'security'
means any note, stock, ... investments contract, ... fractional interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
right ..... "
119 328 U.S. 293 (1946) [hereinafter Howey].
120 485 P. 2d 105 (Haw. 1971 ) [hereinafter Hawaii].
121 Howey, supra note 119 at 299.
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The Court defined investment contract by a four pronged test: (1)
money has to be invested (2) in a common enterprise (3) with the
expectation of profit (4) to be derived solely from the efforts of others.
Subsequent case law has modified "solely" to "primarily." 22
In Hawaii, the Supreme Court of Hawaii criticized the Howey
test for being overly mechanical, and devised a broader four-pronged
test to define an investment contract which is commonly known as the
"risk capital" test.123 An ihvestment contract exists when (1) an offeree
furnishes initial value (money is invested), (2) a portion of this money is
subject to the risks of enterprise, (3) the investor is induced into giving
initial value by a promise or representation that the investor will make a
profit as a result of the operations of the enterprise, and (4) the investor
does not have the right to exercise actual or practical control over
managerial decisions of the enterprise.124 Like the Howey Court, the
Hawaii court emphasized the policy of investor protection underlying the
Act and the remedial nature of the legislation.
The leading case in Canada that speaks to the definition of
investment contract is Pacific Coast Coin,125 which accepted both the
Howey and Hawaii tests. Pacific Coast sold silver coins on margin. It
solicited investors mainly through newspaper advertisements, and
emphasized that an investment in silver coins was "reliable" and an
"almost perfect" protection against inflation. The margin agreement
required the investor to initially pay only a portion of the purchase price.
The investor could then elect to take delivery of the coins or sell the
coins at the current market price using Pacific Coast's services. The
investors faced significant risks, including the uncertainty resulting from
Pacific Coast not keeping a full inventory of coins purchased by
investors,126 meaning that the value of investors' portfolio of silver coins
fluctuated according to the market price. For these reasons, a majority
of the Supreme Court of Canada held the scheme was an investment
contract and thus a security within the meaning of the osA.
In analyzing the Howey and Hawaii decisions, the Court
acknowledged refinements to the Howey test that modified "solely" to
"primarily," and also reasoned that "common enterprise" in Howey
referred to vertical commonality, so that the relationship between
122 Gillen, supra note 113 at at 92.
123 See Hawaii, supra note 120; and Gillen, supra note 113 at 93.
124 Ibi.
125 Supra note 116.
126 Ibi. at 125.
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investors and the promoter, not investors vis-ti-vis each other, is relevant.
The decision, in effect, accepted the criteria in Howey and Hawaii as the
tests to define an investment contract.
Like the Howey and Hawaii courts, the Court also analyzed the
case from a public policy standpoint, and noted that the policy of the
legislation is "clearly the protection of the public"' 27 so as to "replace
the harshness of caveat emptor in security related transactions." 12s The
Court also relied on Re Ontario Securities Commission and Brigadoon
Scotch Distributors (Canada) Limited129 in which the Ontario High Court
said that "the basic aim or purpose of the Securities Act, 1966, ... is the
protection of the investing public through full, true and plain disclosure
of all material facts relating to securities being issued." 3 0 The majority
opinion then stated that "[s]uch remedial legislation must be construed
broadly, and it must be read in the context of the economic realities to
which it is addressed. Substance, not form, is the governing factor."' 3'
Laskin J., in dissent, criticized the majority's opinion on the basis
that it used Pacific Coast's potential insolvency as determinative of
whether the scheme constituted a security. He found that the risks
associated with the investment were not determined by Pacific Coast's
conduct but rather by the market. He stated that courts should not be
too quick to enlarge the scope of statutory control if the legislature
deliberately did not define a term to include a particular transaction.
An investment in a lawsuit is not specifically enumerated as a
security under the osA. Nevertheless, it is capable of falling within the
broad concept of "investment contract," thus requiring the issuance of a
prospectus. An application of the common enterprise test set out in
Howey would result in investor financed litigation being considered an
investment contract. The first prong is met in that there will be an
investment of money by the third-party investor. Under normal
circumstances, services can be provided in lieu of cash as consideration
for an investment. However, in the context of investor financed lawsuits,
the plaintiff's most significant service requirement will be legal services.
The provision of legal services in exchange for a share in a lawsuit is
merely a contingency fee arrangement, which is outside the scope of the
127 Ibid. at 126.
128 Ibid. at 132.
129 (1970), 3 O.R. 714 (H.C.J.).
130 Ibid. at 717, cited in Pacific Coast supra note 116 at 126.
131 Supra note 116 at 127.
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definition of an investment contract, as will be analyzed when discussing
the fourth prong of the Howey test.
The second prong of common enterprise (more particularly,
vertical commonality) is satisfied because the third-party investor's
"fortunes ... are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and
success of those seeking the investment." 132 The third prong of the test
will be satisfied because the investors will have an expectation of
profit. 33 The fourth prong would also likely be satisfied in that the
expectation of profit depends largely on the efforts of others, in
particular, the lawyers retained by the plaintiff. On the other hand, one
can pose an argument based on Laskin J.'s dissent in Pacific Coast that
the success of a lawsuit is governed largely by the facts at issue and the
applicable laws. If this argument is accepted, an investment in a lawsuit
would not be considered a security and a prospectus would not be
required. However, the majority's position in Pacific Coast will likely
prevail because the reputation and skill of an advocate cannot be
underestimated, particularly at the trial level. In any event, the investor
has no part to play in the profit-making of the scheme, thereby satisfying
the fourth prong of the Howey test.134
An application of the risk capital test prescribed in Hawaii leads
to a similar result. The third-party investor invests in the lawsuit to
finance the costs of litigation, realizing that the investment is subject to
risk of loss if the lawsuit fails, but expecting a return on the investment.
Most importantly, the fourth prong of the test will be satisfied in that the
third-party investor will not under most circumstances exercise control
over the litigation, in developing legal theories and strategy, determining
which witnesses to call, and making or accepting settlement offers, for
example. At the very least, these elements of substantial control will not
be at the investors' discretion.
An examination of the primary policy underlying securities
legislation, that is, protection of the investing public, confirms that the
132 Ibid. at 129.
133 This requirement will not be met if the investor is providing the investment capital for
reasons of social interest, such as the funding of public interest litigation, where the investor's
motivation is not the expectation of personal monetary gain. This situation will not arise in our
scheme because the purpose of this scheme is to solicit investment capital from investors who see
promise in the litigation and hope to profit from such an investment.
134 A contingency fee arrangement between a solicitor and a client is not a security because
the efforts of the lawyers are instrumental in determining the success of the lawyer's investment in
the case. Also, the policy underlying the OSA would suggest that the lawyer as investor does not
need to be protected in the circumstances.
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proposed scheme would constitute a "security."35 Like any other
business venture where capital is subject to negative as well as positive
fluctuations, investment in lawsuits can be a very risky proposition
simply because if the lawsuit fails, the investment fails. The investor will
lose the entire investment. The following is a partial list of the factors
that may be considered relevant to a third-party investor in determining
the risks of a particular lawsuit and that would be required to allow for
full, true and plain disclosure:
0 A description of the litigation, including a legal opinion on the
strength of the causes of action and potential defenses;
0 A description of the legal teams for the plaintiff and defendant,
including their background, reputation and experience on similar
cases;
0 A detailed break-down of the amount claimed;
0 A detailed break-down of the expected costs of the lawsuit,
including legal fees and significant disbursements;
0 Details of how the investment funds will be used in the litigation
and an estimate of the proceeds of the securities issue;
0 A description of the nature of the investment (equity or debt,
rate of return, priority, and control features such as voting
rights);
0 The length of time expected until final resolution; and
0 Underwriters' and promoters' fees.
One could argue that disclosure of information of this kind about
litigation is confidential and could be detrimental to the plaintiffs case
should the opponent get access to it. However, other parties engaged in
the raising of public funds are also subject to disclosure requirements
which may expose sensitive information to competitors. There is no
reason to distinguish investor financed lawsuits from these ventures,
given the investor protection mandate underlying securities regulation.
Without prospectus disclosure, the theory is that some information
would not be produced and it would be difficult for a market to
accurately and efficiently price lawsuits. 136
135 It is worthwhile to bear in mind as well that s. 10 of the Interpretations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
1-11, states that a statute should be interpreted to achieve its objectives. Since a primary objective
of the OSA is to protect the investing public, definitions under the Act ought to be interpreted in a
manner consistent with this objective.
136 J.G. Macintosh, Legal and Institutional Barriers to Financing Innovative Enterprise in
Canada (Kingston: Government and Competitiveness, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University,
1994) at 115-22.
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Based on a doctrinal and public policy analysis, it appears that a
prospectus will need to be issued if the plaintiff wishes to obtain the
capital of public investors to finance the litigation, unless the financing
can fit into an exemption from the prospectus requirement.
C. Exemptions fi-om the Prospectus Requirement
A number of possible exemptions are available from the
prospectus requirement that might be practicable in relation to lawsuit
financing, including the following:
1. Exempt institutions
Certain institutions, such as banks, trust companies, and
insurance companies are exempt institutional purchasers 3 7 because it is
assumed that these institutions have the knowledge, or the ability to
gather the necessary information, to make informed investment
decisions.138
2. Exempt institutional purchaser
Certain institutional purchasers other than exempt institutions as
listed above, can apply to the osc for a discretionary exemption from
the prospectus requirement. 3 9 The osc will consider the degree of
sophistication of the institution in deciding whether to grant the
exemption. 40
3. Seed capital exemption
An exemption from the requirement to issue a prospectus is also
available where a limited number of potential investors are solicited (a
maximum of fifty of which twenty-five may purchase); the investors have
sufficient net worth and investment experience (or access to it) so as to
13 7
oSA,supra note 111, s. 72(1)(a).
138 See Gillen, supra note 113 at 191.
139 osA, supra note 111, s. 72(1)(c).
140 See Gillen, supra note 113 at 193.
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evaluate the prospective investment; and each purchaser is provided
with substantially the same information that would be contained in a
prospectus.141 This last requirement has been interpreted as requiring
the issuance of an offering memorandum, containing prospectus-like
disclosure, to which civil liability attaches for misrepresentations.
4. $150,000 "Private placement" exemption
An exemption exists when an investor purchases more than
$150,000 of the securities of an issuer. 142 The rationale is that such a
purchaser will have a greater incentive to seek advice with respect to the
investment, and will be in a position vis-i-vis the issuer to obtain relevant
information required to analyze the investment.1 43
5. Close bonds exemption
.When the investor is the spouse, parent, brother, sister or child
of a senior officer or director of the issuer,1 44 there is an exemption from
the prospectus requirement. The rationales are that the issuer will not
exploit these individuals and that these individuals will have access to
material information about the issuer as a result of their relationship
with the issuer.
6. Private company exemption
The private company exemption 45 allows an issuer to sell
securities without a prospectus if its shares are subject to restrictions on
their transfer, the shares are not owned by more than fifty people, and
the shares have not been distributed "to the public." The meaning of "to
the public" is set out in the leading cases of Securities and Exchange
141 See Johnson & Doyle Rockwell, supra note 113 at 113.
142 osA, supra note 111, s. 72(1)(d), modified by o.A Reg. 1015, s. 27.
143 Gillen, supra note 113 at 194; and J. Macintosh, Regulatory Barriers to Raising Capital for
Small Firms (Toronto: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canadian Law & Economics
Association, 1994) at 10 [hereinafter Regulatory Barriers].
144 oSA, supra note 111, ss. 72(l)(p)(ii)(B)-(D).
145 Ibid. ss. 73(l)(a), 35(2)(10).
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Commission v. Ralston Purina Co.146 and R. v. Piepgrass.147 The use of
the term "to the public" allows courts and regulators to consider the
situations in which investors would need protection. In Purina, the
United States Supreme Court articulated the "need to know" test, which
asks whether the potential investors would need to know the information
that would be contained in a prospectus.1 48 In Piepgrass, the Alberta
Court of Appeal articulated a different test, the common bonds test,
which asks whether the potential investors are friends or associates of
the promoter, or persons having common bonds of interest or
association with the promoter.1 49
7. Socially desirable activity
An exemption is available for securities sold by an issuer
organized exclusively for "educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable,
religious or recreational purposes and not for profit."150
8. Discretionary exemption order
The issuer can obtain an exemption order from the osc when the
transaction does not fit under a recognized exemption but where it can
be demonstrated that the goal of investor protection would not be
sacrificed. The osc has the power to grant an exemption order if it is
satisfied that to do so would not be "prejudicial to the public interest."lS1
9. Application
Most of the exemptions discussed in the preceding sections are
either not available or not cost-effective. The exemption for socially
desirable activity would not be available because investors would be
146 73 S. Ct. 981 (1953) [hereinafter Purina].
147 (1959), 29 W.W.R. 218 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter Piepgrass].
148 Purina, supra note 146 at 984-85.
149 Piepgrass, supra note 147 at 227.
150 osm, supra note 111, ss. 73(1)(a), 35(2)(7).
151 Ibid. s. 74.
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investing with the expectation of profit.1 52 The close bonds exemption
would not have much practical benefit, given its limited scope. While
banks and insurance companies would be able to rely on the exemption
for institutions, they have not historically invested in lawsuits and are
unlikely to do so given the real and perceived risks to which they may be
exposed.
The seed capital exemption is limited because of the restrictions
on advertising which necessitate the plaintiff soliciting funds from known
sources. In addition, this exemption may not be appropriate for lawsuit
funding because it was initially crafted to provide financing for
businesses in the early stages of their life-cycle, whereas litigation does
not fit neatly into this model.
A discretionary exemption order might be available if the
investment does not fit neatly into one of the exemptions enumerated in
the oSA.153 However, its viability will depend upon the size of the legal
claim because the cost of applying for this exemption will amount to
several thousand dollars.154
The three most viable exemptions are the $150,000 exemption,
the private company exemption, and the institutional purchaser
exemption, primarily because no disclosure is mandated by the securities
legislation, and thus minimal costs are required to utilize these
exemptions. The $150,000 exemption is an option for sophisticated
investors willing to invest in the lawsuit. The private company
exemption would be available if either of the Purina or Piepgrass tests is
met. The Puina test would be satisfied if a sophisticated investor can be
found. The benefit of the Purina test as compared to the $150,000
exemption is that the former does not require a minimum investment,
thus allowing for a larger class of potential investors. The Piepgrass test
would be available but likely too narrow to have any significant impact.
However, a recent osc decision interpreted "to the public" as requiring
that both the Purina and Piepgrass tests be met so that the close friends
must also be sophisticated investors.1 55 If the osc's interpretation is
152 Since the investor of a socially desirable activity likely does not expect a return or profit on
the investment, it seems that such investments would not even constitute a security within the
meaning of the osA.
153 See Gillen, supra note 113 at 219-20 for discussion of when a discretionary exemption
order might be granted.
154 See ibid. at 220; and Johnson & Doyle Rockwell, supra note 113 at 129.
155 See Regulatory Barriers, supra note 143 at 12 where he analyzes the implications of the osc's
decision.
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correct, it places too great a burden on plaintiffs who wish to use this
exemption.
The institutional purchaser exemption may be the most viable of
the available exemptions. A litigation investment fund could be
established for the purpose of financing lawsuits. Potential plaintiffs
would have their legal claims assessed by the fund's staff of lawyers and
could potentially obtain the financing necessary to pursue their
respective litigation. The establishment of such a fund would dispense
with the need for prospectus-like disclosure on the part of each potential
plaintiff so long as the fund meets the criteria required to employ the
institutional purchaser exemption. Such criteria would include the
ability to analyze the merits of potential plaintiffs' claims, assess the
likelihood of success, determine the quantum of a possible award,
estimate the costs of the litigation, and finally, calculate whether the
expected award is greater than the estimated costs and thus a viable
investment.
D. The Costs of Compliance with Securities Regulation
As noted earlier, the primary purpose of securities regulation is
investor protection.S 6 The 1997 Ontario Securities Commission Annual
Report describes the mission statement of the osc as follows: "To
protect investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices and to
foster fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in their
integrity." 5 7 This rationale assumes market failure in that information
asymmetries exist between firms offering securities and purchasers of
securities, and firms will exploit these asymmetries and systematically
take advantage of purchasers to their detriment. Thus, disclosure of
information has been mandated by legislation to correct this market
failure.
However, regulation entails costs. While the osc recognizes the
"need to balance investor protection against the need for companies to
raise capital from the public at a cost which is not prohibitive,"SS
current disclosure requirements can be criticized for not being cost-
effective. For example, the requirement to supply a prospectus to all
purchasers of securities imposes significant costs but does not achieve its
156 See the discussion in Pacific Coast at notes 127-131, supra, and accompanying text.
157 Ontario Securities Commission, 1997 Annual Report: A Changing Commission for a
Changing Market (Toronto: Ontario Securities Commission, 1997) at 5.
158 Ibid.
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primary goal, since it is widely known that most individual investors do
not read them.159  Even the exemptions from the prospectus
requirement, which were designed to allow firms to raise capital with
greater ease (both in terms of regulation and cost), still contain
requirements that impose significant costs without furthering the goal of
investor protection. Jeffrey MacIntosh argues in favor of various
reforms to the exemptions to allow small firms to raise capital with
greater ease without significantly detracting from the protection of
investors.160 The Ontario Securities Commission Report on Small Firm
Financing has recommended that the exemptions be reconstructed and
simplified, and that, in particular, the requirement for an offering
memorandum in relation to the seed capital exemption be eliminated. 161
These proposals have not yet been enacted by the legislature.
E. Conclusion
The above analysis suggests that a prospectus will be required
unless an appropriate exemption can be found. The requirement to
make disclosure through a prospectus is costly and onerous. Thus, it
appears that the issuance of a prospectus will be cost-effective only in
litigation involving significant expected awards, particularly class action
lawsuits. For most other lawsuits, an exemption from the requirement to
issue a prospectus will be required to make investor financing of
litigation practical. Given the cost barriers imposed by some of the
exemptions, they ought to be re-evaluated and made more cost-effective
so that investor financing of litigation can have wider application. While
it is not certain that investor financed litigation would fall into the osc
Task Force's proposals for small firm financing, enactment of their
recommendations would be a step in the right direction, as they strike a
better balance between the goal of investor' protection and the costs of
regulation than current laws.
159 See Regulatory Barriers, supra note 143 at 25-33.
160 See ibid.
161 Ontario Securities Commission, Task Force on Small Business Financing: Final Report
(Toronto: Ontario Securities Commission, 1996) at 1-15.
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F. Protection of the Plaintiff-Towards a Regulatory Framework
An appropriate regulatory structure should be devised to address
concerns about the potential exploitation of unsophisticated plaintiffs by
savvy and knowledgeable investors, promoters and investment funds.
While Part VI, below, discusses specific issues in relation to protecting
plaintiffs, such as who controls the litigation and conflict of interests, a
choice will have to be made among a number of regulatory instruments
in attempting to achieve this goal. Clear and specific legislative
provisions would have the benefit of providing parties with greater
certainty as to their relationship; a requirement of judicial or
administrative approval would have the benefit of increased flexibility,
although this would come with additional costs; a third option would be
a modification of Michael Trebilcock's recommendation in relation to
contingency fees that disclosure of any investors financing litigation be
mandated, a database be set up, and details of financing arrangements
be publicly available. 162
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The policy arguments for and against investor financing of
litigation are identified and evaluated below. The greatest benefit of
investor financed litigation is the potential for increased access to the
justice system. A secondary benefit is behaviour modification. The fact
that established models of financing litigation are limited in their ability
to achieve these dual goals further amplifies the benefits of investor
financing.
In what follows, it is suggested that critics will argue that investor
financed lawsuits will increase frivolous litigation, decrease settlement,
and encourage the manipulation of witnesses and evidence. Arguments
to the contrary are that these claims are exaggerated and overstated, and
the concerns raised therein are addressed by existing procedural
safeguards. Possible critiques that this development is morally
questionable and that it reinforces a rights-oriented society are also
addressed. The conclusion reached below is that the advantages of this
development outweigh the costs, and that in sum, the interests of justice
are served by allowing investors to finance lawsuits.
162 See Trebilcock, supra note 21.
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A. The Case for a More Secure Footing for Investor Financing
The financing of lawsuits by third-party investors will increase
access to the civil justice system for individuals who have meritorious
claims but who lack the financial resources to pursue them. Upon
comparison of the average costs of litigation to the average salary of
Canadians (as set out above163), it is not controversial to conclude that
many meritorious claims are not currently litigated.164 It is undesirable
that the costs of litigating claims often prevent meritorious claims from
being pursued. Only individuals of some wealth in our society can
undertake litigation. This is a significant problem for the administration
of civil justice. As Mr. Justice Cory of the Supreme Court of Canada
stated in Coronation Insurance, "[l]egal rights are illusory and no more
than a source of frustration if they cannot be recognised and
enforced." 165
The financing of lawsuits by third-party investors will also
provide a greater incentive than now exists to potential wrongdoers to
abide by legal rules.1 66 In the absence of investor financing, many
meritorious claims are not pursued because they are not economically
viable. Potential wrongdoers, aware of this reality, may flout the law,
rationally calculating that their wrongdoing may not result in a lawsuit.
The availability of investor financing, however, may deter potential
wrongdoers from violating the law, because of the greater likelihood that
they will be sued if their actions result in injury to others. 167 Despite the
increased likelihood of being sued, wrongdoers may nonetheless violate
legal rules if the benefit of violating the rule is greater than the cost of so
doing, including the amount that might be recovered from the
163 See notes 3-6, supra, and accompanying text.
164 See Dobner, supra note 74 at 1552.
165 As quoted in Nantais, supra note 4 at 534.
166 My argument works off the premise that behaviour modification or deterrence is one of
the goals of the civil justice system. For a discussion on the continuing philosophical debate as to
the proper purpose(s) of civil litigation (conflict resolution and/or deterrence), see Report on Class
Actions, supra note 15 at 140-46; and Roach, supra note 11 at 394.
167 A similar rationale was provided in the context of class actions. See Report on Class
Actions, supra note 15 at 140-46.
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plaintiff.' 68 Nevertheless, the public policy favouring the internalization
of the costs of an individuals's behaviour is strengthened.
A comparison of investor financing with other models of funding
litigation reinforces the benefits of this development, particularily upon
analysis of the limitations of the existing models. As discussed in more
detail in Part II, above, legal aid plays a very limited role in funding civil
litigation, even for the very poor. Similary, public litigation subsidy
funds are limited in their ability to acheive the goals of accessibilty and
deterrence because of their focus on class actions to the exclusion of
individual claims, their inability to provide assistance for legal fees, the
pre-set reimbursement rate of 10 per cent resulting in inefficient
allocation of funds, and the small capital base. In contrast, investor
financing would be available in theory to fund individual and class
actions, provide assistance for legal fees as well as disbursements, tailor
an individualized rate of return appropriate to the risks of the particular
litigation, and have the potential to provide and raise much more capital.
Similarly, investor financing can nicely complement contingency fee
arrangements because third-party investors may be less risk averse and
better bearers of risk than lawyers and as a result, they may be willing to
finance cases that lawyers may be unwilling to take on. The fact that
lawyers may not be willing to assume the entire risk of loss associated
with a case is highlighted in Nantais in which the plaintiff's lawyer could
have financed the entire litigation through a contingency fee
arrangement, but instead preferred to shift a portion of the risk to
private investors.
B. Addressing Problems Associated with Widespread
Availability of Investor Financing
1. Encourage frivolous litigation
An argument against investor financing of lawsuits is that it will
encourage frivolous and vexatious litigation and thus backlog the courts.
While any increase in litigation will place additional demands on an
168 See generally R. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 J.L. & Econ. 1; and B.R.
Cheffins, Company Law: Theoy, Structure and Operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) where
Cheffins states, at 25, that Coase's "reasoning suggests that whenever people encounter legal rules
which do not suit their interests, they may well negotiate around those rules and formulate a
mutually advantageous and socially optimal solution."
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already backlogged court system, there are three responses to this
concern. 169
First, an increase in meritorious lawsuits should be expected and
applauded given that a goal of this development is to increase access to
the civil justice system for individuals who are currently unable to afford
the costs of litigation. Second, the proportion of frivolous lawsuits to
meritorious lawsuits will not increase under this development because
the rules of civil procedure filter out frivolous and vexatious claims early
in the trial process. For example, a defendant can bring a motion for
summary judgment to strike out a claim when there is no genuine issue
for trial.170 Thus, it is unjust to prohibit all investor financed lawsuits,
including ones that are meritorious, on the basis that some claims that
are financed by investors may be frivolous, given that wealthy individuals
are permitted to pursue any and all claims regardless of merit, subject
only to summary judgment rules.
In fact, the proportion of frivolous lawsuits to meritorious
lawsuits will in all likelihood decrease under this development. This is
because of the nature of investment. A frivolous and vexatious lawsuit is
one that lacks merit and is commenced for the purpose of harassing,
intimidating or irritating the defendant. Rational investors, being
interested only in monetary return, will be unwilling to advance funds to
finance frivolous lawsuits. In fact, investors will seek out those lawsuits
which appear to be most meritorious, because they will have the greatest
probability of success. Thus, rather than encouraging frivolous and
vexatious lawsuits, investors will actually serve as a private screening
mechanism to sift out non-meritorious claims.171
169 See M.J. Trebilcock & K. Roach, "Private Enforcement of Competition Laws" (1996) 34
Osgoode Hall L.J. 461 for a similar discussion in relation to the case for private enforcement of
competition laws where they also reject the claim that private enforcement will increase the
percentage of frivolous and vexatious claims, if a variety of appropriate procedural rules and
constraints are in place.
170 Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 20, as amended to 0. Reg.
333/96, which deals with motions for summary judgment.
171 Because investor financing will be a private order mechanism and will be dictated by
private tastes, lawsuits involving violations of constitutional rights, or demanding injunctive relief,
may not get funding as easily as suits involving damage awards. Thus, this financing method will
likely not change the state of current laws, but will simply allow greater access to the courts for more
people.
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2. Discourage settlement
Another argument against investor financed lawsuits is that they
will discourage settlement. Currently, only about 5 per cent of actions
that are commenced reach trial.1 72 A large proportion of the remaining
actions are resolved by non-adjudicative techniques, such as mediation
or negotiation.173 Encouraging settlement is indeed a laudable policy
goal and in the best interests of the administration of justice because it
substantially reduces the costs of running the court system. If all actions
that are commenced were to see their day in court, our court system
would come to a stand-still. However, the claim that private investor
financing of lawsuits will result in fewer claims being settled requires
scrutiny.
It is possible that this development may lead to fewer claims
being settled. This should not be perceived as a disadvantage. In this
context, less settlement may actually serve the interests of justice. While
ideally, lawsuits settle because the parties perceive the settlement to be
fair and reasonable, the ideal and the reality do not always resemble one
another. In reality, whether parties settle, and on what terms, is "a
function of the resources available to each party to finance the litigation,
and those resources are frequently distributed unequally." 174 The
financially weaker party may lack the information required to make an
informed decision about the merits of the case, may settle because of an
inability to afford prolonged litigation, and may be pressured into
settling because of a need to receive an award sooner rather than
later. 75 Studies show that a significant percentage of parties who settle
do not consider their settlements to be "fair" or "adequate.", 7 6 As Marc
Galanter and Mia Cahill write:
It is often asserted that parties are more satisfied with settlements than with adjudicated
outcomes. This is plausible insofar as one associates settlement with greater party
172 This figure appears to be more anecdotal than empirical. See G.Watson et al., Civil
Litigation Cases and Materials, 4th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 11; and M. Galanter
& M. Cahill, "'Most Cases Settle': Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements" (1994) 46
Stan. L. Rev. 1339.
173 Ibid.
174 O.M. Fiss, "Against Settlement" (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073 at 1076. See also various articles
from the Symposium on Contingency Fee Financing, supra note 21.
175 See Fiss, supra note 174 at 1076-78.
176 See D. Caplovitz, Consumers in Trouble: A Study of Debtors in Default (New York: Free
Press, 1974) at 245, where only 53 per cent of 314 debtors who settled debt out of court viewed their
settlement as fair.
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participation and control, the possibility of individualizing outcomes to suit the needs of
the parties, and so forth. But even so, significant numbers of those who settle are not
very happy with the outcome.
[T]he mere occurrence of settlement (or trial) does not establish that the parties prefer
the process or that they regard the outcome as optimal. ... This is especially so for
unsophisticated, "one-shot" parties. These limitations should caution us against equating
party choice to settle or to litigate with an infqrmed affirmation of tile quality of tile
selection process.
1 7 7
Investor financing of lawsuits will alleviate the pressures discussed above
because a financially weaker plaintiff will now have the funds to take an
action to court if a defendant refuses to settle on reasonable terms. This
is a commendable result despite the potential of increased costs to the
taxpayer and strain on the court system.
In particular circumstances, the development of investor
financing may lead to faster and more settlements. Currently, wealthier
defendants may hold out from settling because of their knowledge that
the plaintiff cannot afford continued litigation. Under a scheme of
investor financing, defendants who are aware that the plaintiff's financial
pressures have been, or can be, alleviated will have greater incentives to
settle.' 78
Finally, there is a second argument suggesting that settlement
rates will not decrease. Private investors who control litigation 79 will be
subject to rules of civil procedure that encourage settlement. The rules
provide incentives in the form of cost sanctions for parties who do not
accept reasonable offers made by an opponent. For example, Rule 49 of
the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that if one party to a
lawsuit makes a written offer to settle which is not accepted and then at
trial receives a better result than that proposed in the offer, the party
that rejected the offer may be subject to significant cost sanctions.o80
Presumably, an investor controlling a lawsuit, like any litigant, will
rationally calculate the advantages and disadvantages of making or
accepting an offer to settle given these cost incentives.
1 7 7 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 172 at 1353, 1358-59.
178 See Dobner, supra note 74.
179 It is not necessarily the case that private investors would control the direction, settlement,
and strategy of a lawsuit by the mere fact of financing it. See Part VI(B)(4), below.
180 Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 170, Rule 49.10(1)-(2). See also Watson et al.,supra
note 172 at 26.
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3. Manufacturing evidence and suborning of witnesses
Another argument against investor financed litigation is the fear
that a third-party investor in a lawsuit will have irresistible temptations
to suppress or produce evidence or to suborn witnesses. In Pielak, the
court stated, "Champerty has attracted condemnation because of the
supposed temptation for the champertous maintainer to suppress or
manufacture evidence or even suborn witnesses for his own special
gain."' 8 '
The concern that any party having an interest in a lawsuit might
tamper with evidence or suborn witnesses is well-founded, but this
concern should be no greater when the party in question is a third-party
investor as opposed to the plaintiff to a lawsuit.
In fact, it is plausible that a plaintiff to a lawsuit has a greater
incentive than a third-party investor to tamper with evidence or
witnesses, because in addition to having the same financial interest in a
lawsuit as would a third-party investor, the plaintiff may also be
motivated by revenge or personal satisfaction. Economic analysis of
corporate law also suggests that the plaintiff to a lawsuit would have a
greater incentive to engage in such activity than third-party private
investors, particularly if the investors hold small stakes in the lawsuit. 8 2
Shareholders who hold small stakes in corporations do not have the
economic incentives to engage in monitoring of management because
their expected gains are small as compared to the costs of monitoring.
This effect is known as shareholders' rational apathy. Such shareholders
would prefer to free ride on the efforts of others, and because of
collective action problems, shareholders will not pool their resources to
monitor collectively.' 8 3 Similarly, it would not be economically viable for
an investor with a small interest in a lawsuit to expend the cost and time
required to tamper with evidence or suborn witnesses because the effort
will result in a relatively small personal gain and other investors and the
181 Piclak, supra note 60 at 609.
182 See generally F.H. Buckley, M. Gillen, & R. Yalden, Corporations: Principles and Policies,
3d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1995) at 533-37; J.S. Ziegel et al., Cases and Materials in
Partnerships and Canadian Business Corporations, vol. 2, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at 389-98;
and R.C. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston: Little and Brown, 1986) at 390-96.
183 However, a shareholder's incentive to monitor management increases as stakeholding in
the corporation increases. The rise of institutional investors reflects this phenomena. See J.G.
Macintosh, "The Role of Institutional and Retail Investors in Canadian Capital Markets" (1993) 31
Osgoode Hall L.J. 371; and B.S. Black, "The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The
Empirical Evidence" (1992) 39 UCLA L Rev. 895.
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plaintiff will free ride on this effort. For example, if an investor has a 10
per cent stake in a lawsuit which will yield a total expected return of
$100, the investor stands to gain $10. If the cost of tampering with
evidence is greater than the expected gain for the investor, the investor
will not tamper with the evidence (e.g., a cost of tampering of $30 would
result in a loss to the investor of $20). If the cost of tampering is less
than the investor's expected gain, but the gain is significantly reduced
because the cost is relatively high, then the investor will not tamper with
the evidence (e.g., a cost of tampering of $8 would result in a gain to the
investor of $2). If the cost of tampering is less than the investor's
expected gain and the gain is not significantly reduced, it is conceded
that an investor may indeed tamper with evidence (e.g., a cost of
tampering of $1 would result in gain to the investor of $9). Nevertheless,
the above analysis suggests that a plaintiff who will retain the largest
stake in the lawsuit would have the greatest incentive to engage in such
activity.18 4
In any event, concerns about evidence and witness abuse are
overstated given that they are addressed by Part IV of the Criminal Code
which deals with Offences Against Law and Justice. The offences of
fabricating evidence,185 obstructing justice,18 6 perjury,18 7 and witnesses
giving contradictory evidence188 would appear to provide strong
disincentives for such misconduct, whether by the plaintiff or the third-
party investor.
4. Strip plaintiff of control
A concern can be raised that investors involved in financing a
lawsuit will strip the plaintiff of control over the direction of the lawsuit.
Whether an investor would have any control over the direction of a
lawsuit could be left to negotiation between the plaintiff and the
investor. However, as a policy matter, it may be prudent to keep control
over key decisions in the plaintiff's hands. The investors will seek
compensation for their lack of control over key decisions by demanding
184 Apart from general collective action problems, the investor cannot collect from the other
investors because of the illegal nature of the undertaking, and the inherent riskiness involved in
forming a cartel.
185 Criminal Code, supra note 40, s. 137.
186 Ibid. s. 139.
18 7 1bid. s. 131(1).
188 Ibid. s. 136(1).
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a greater return on their investment. This approach is analogous to the
situation when founding shareholders in a corporation seek funds for
growth but desire to retain control of the corporation. Rather than
issuing common shares that have the right to vote, preferred shares with
no voting rights are issued for a fixed and higher rate of return.189
5. Increased rights-oriented society
A further critique of investor financing of lawsuits may be that it
will reinforce a rights-oriented society and further entrench the
adversarial system for dispute resolution. Critics of the adversarial
system argue that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as
mediation and arbitration, are less costly, foster a better process (in that
they are more community oriented and attempt to preserve
relationships), and lead to better results (because of the ability to
fashion creative solutions).190  With respect to the issue of costs,
Morrison and Mosher write that "there is no empirical literature which
establishes any necessary cost savings to the disputants (indeed A.D.R.
may render the proceedings more expensive if it becomes an additional
and necessary pre-condition to accessing a decision-maker)."191
Therefore, if the costs of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms act
as a barrier to utilizing such processes, investors could also theoretically
finance disputes to be resolved through these mechanisms.
6. Morally questionable
Critics also argue that this development is morally questionable
because it will allow third parties to profit from other people's
injuries.192 However, it would seem perverse to maintain the status quo
and thereby allow wrongdoers to profit from the plaintiffs inability to
pursue a legal claim. Thus, if investors are prevented from financing
meritorious claims, potential defendants will be allowed to retain a
189 See Buckley, Gillen & Yalden, supra note 182 at 201-02.
190 See G.W. Adams & N.L. Bussin, "Alternative Dispute Resolution and Canadian Courts: A
Time for Change" (1995) 17 Advocates' Q. 133; and D.P. Emond, ed., Commercial Dispute
Resolution: Alternatives to Litigation (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1989). However, see also
Morrison & Mosher, supra note 9 at 659.
191 See Morrison & Mosher, supra note 9 at 659.
192 See Lawton, supra note 97.
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windfall gain as a result of their wrongdoing. An investment in a lawsuit
is analogous to an investment in the stock of a pharmaceutical company.
Rather than viewing the ownership of stock in a pharmaceutical
company solely as an attempt by the investor to profit from the illnesses
of others, the overall effect of the investor's decision is to allow for the
pharmaceutical company to conduct research for the development of
potentially life-saving drugs. Second, it appears unjust to prohibit the
owner to sell or assign a portion of a legal claim given that those who
own real or personal property generally have unrestricted rights of
alienation. Third, the perceived repugnancy of this development
appears to be related to the potential abuses rather than to a moral
statement that lawsuits should not be subject to market forces. If so,
potential safeguards to remedy the abuses have been outlined in this
paper which should satisfy such concerns.
7. Lawyer's conflict of interest
Critics of the development may also argue that lawyers
representing the plaintiff may find themselves in a conflict between the
plaintiff's interest and the investors' interests, particularly if the lawyer is
involved in locating the investors and negotiating the terms of the
investment with them. This concern can be addressed by requiring
lawyers acting for plaintiffs to advise investors to seek independent legal
advice as to the merits of the investment and the nature of the
contractual arrangement.
8. Adverse costs award
Another issue raised by this development is whether the plaintiff
or the investor is responsible for an adverse costs award. Courts have
legislative authority to award costs against the unsuccessful party to a
litigation for a portion of the legal expenses incurred by the successful
party.193 Courts also have an inherent jurisdiction to award costs against
non-parties where there has been improper conduct, as in Smith.194 A
reasonable argument can be made that investors should be responsible
193 See Watson et aL, supra note 172 at 418-37, 511-21; M. Orkin, The Law of Costs (Aurora,
Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994); and the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, s. 131.
194 However, if the doctrines of maintenance and champerty are abolished as has been
recommended, then investor financing will not be construed as improper conduct.
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for costs awards where they control the direction of a lawsuit, and in
essence take the place of the plaintiff, as occurs when claims are
subrogated to insurance companies. However, an investor who only
provides funding and does not retain any control over the litigation, as
proposed in this paper, ought not to be subject to cost sanctions.
Critics may insist that third-party investors should be subject to
cost sanctions in any event, since the policies underlying cost awards are
intended to deter marginal claims and compensate the successful party,
and thus control is irrelevant. If so, it will have to be determined
whether investors will be jointly and severally liable with the plaintiff and
other investors, or whether a cost award will be awarded on a
proportionate basis to the investment. Drawing from the rich academic
literature on the limited liability of shareholders, wealthy individuals will
have a disincentive to finance lawsuits under a rule of joint and several
liability because defendants will pursue those persons with the deepest
pockets in collecting the award. 195 However, this concern can be
eliminated by establishing a liability rule where the investor is
responsible for a proportionate share of the costs.
C. Conclusion
In sum, the benefits of allowing investors to finance lawsuits
appear to outweigh the costs. While the arguments against investor
financing are legitimate, the balance tips in favour of investor financed
litigation because of its ability to further the goals of access to justice and
behaviour modification. The framework of procedural safeguards
discussed above would minimize potential abuses.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed and attempted to cautiously advance
the case for the financing of lawsuits by third-party investors. I have
reviewed the doctrines against maintenance and champerty, argued that
the existing rules and exceptions are fairly incoherent, and that the
justifications are ancient and anachronistic and hold little force in
contemporary society. I have applied the doctrines to the issue of
195 See generally P. Halpern, M. Trebilcock & S. Turnbull, "An Economic Analysis of Limited
Liability in Corporation Law" (1980) 30 U.T.L.J. 117; and F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, The
Economic Stncture of Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
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investor financing and found that there is tremendous uncertainty as to
whether agreements to finance lawsuits would violate these doctrines
and thus result in investors demanding higher rates of return on their
investments. For all the above reasons, I have argued that the
prohibitions against maintenance and champerty should be legislatively
abolished. At a minimum, an exception ought to be legislated so that
investors can finance lawsuits with the certainty that their agreements
will be enforceable. Turning the focus to the protection of investors, the
financing of lawsuits by third-party investors would be subject to
securities laws, thus requiring the issuance of a prospectus unless an
appropriate exemption can be used. Finally, I concluded that the
benefits of this development outweigh the costs and that the related
concerns can be addressed.
Given that the justice system is a fundamental institution in our
society, the ideal solution to ameliorate the economic barriers to
accessing the civil justice system would be to require better funding from
governments. However, governments across Canada have shown little
political will to infuse funds into the justice system.196 In fact, the
federal and provincial governments have recently been cutting back on
social spending in favour of balancing budgets and reducing taxes. 197
Given these harsh practical realities, it is more pragmatic to adopt a
regulated private sector regime of investor financing. Despite its
limitations, the financing of litigation by third-party investors has the
potential to significantly increase access and allow ordinary Canadians to
pursue meritorious claims which were hitherto uneconomical.
196 See, for example, McCamus Report, supra note 1; and Zemans & Monahan, supra note 1.
197 For an excellent account of this phenomena, see L.C. Philipps, "The Rise of Balanced
Budget Laws in Canada: Legislating Fiscal (Ir)responsibility" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 681.
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